How to derive consensus among various marketing journal rankings?

Despite the increasing popularity of journal rankings to evaluate the quality of research contributions, the individual rankings for journals that ranked below the top tier of publications usually feature only modest agreement. Attempts to merge rankings into meta-rankings suffer from some methodological issues, such as mixed measurement scales and incomplete data. This paper addresses the issue of how to construct suitable aggregates of individual journal rankings, using an optimization-based consensus ranking approach. The authors apply the proposed method to a subset of marketing-related journals from a list of collected journal rankings. Next, the paper studies the stability of the derived consensus solution, and the degeneration effects that occur when excluding journals and/or rankings. Finally, the authors investigate the similarities/dissimilarities of the consensus with a naive meta-ranking and with individual rankings. The results show that, even though journals are not uniformly ranked, one may derive a consensus ranking with considerably high agreement with the individual rankings.     

Do rating agencies’ decisions impact stock risks? Evidence from European markets

This article analyses the effect of rating agencies’ decisions on stock risks for European issuers concerning five kinds of events. Our approach is an extension of dummy variable regression event study methodology, using a GARCH(1,1) estimation to capture simultaneously the impact on both systematic and specific stock risks. This new methodology allows us to obtain both global results by categories of rating decisions and individual results, event by event. We document, globally, a positive impact of upgrading on systematic risk, a negative impact of rating confirmation on specific risk, and no significant impact in all other cases. Regarding event-by-event results, the proportion of rating actions exhibiting a significant effect on risk is almost always observed between 20% and 30%. The weak evidence of a global effect on systematic risk may be due to the lack of informational content of the rating decisions on the stocks’ risk, or the existence of rebalancing effects between systematic and idiosyncratic risks. Furthermore, it should be noticed that the decline in volatility in case of a rating affirmed is an insight of the certification role played by the agencies.     

Consumer workers as immaterial labour in the converging media markets: three value‐creation practices

This paper takes a practice‐based approach to consumer studies and focuses on the strategic and productive roles that consumers play as immaterial labour or consumer workers in the converging media markets. Based on a case study of a print media organization and its customers, the aim is to discuss the collaborative practices through which value is created in the market. By means of a textual analysis of online and interview data, three value‐creation practices are abstracted and illustrated: constructing a sense of belonging and collective identity, mutual helping and peer support, and building pride and self‐respect. Overall, the paper suggests that in global media environments, consumer‐customers are playing increasingly significant strategic roles in the practices and processes through which value is co‐created in the market. It is therefore concluded that the idea of consumers, and media audiences in particular, as recipients of communication and targets of marketing activities needs to be problematized and the dynamic strategic roles that consumers currently play in the market need to be acknowledged and actively incorporated into the business praxis of media corporations.     

Why do people tell the truth? Experimental evidence for pure lie aversion

A recent experimental literature shows that truth-telling is not always motivated by pecuniary motives, and several alternative motivations have been proposed. However, their relative importance in any given context is still not totally clear. This paper investigates the relevance of pure lie aversion, that is, a dislike for lies independent of their consequences. We propose a very simple design where other motives considered in the literature predict zero truth-telling, whereas pure lie aversion predicts a non-zero rate. Thus we interpret the finding that more than a third of the subjects tell the truth as evidence for pure lie aversion. Our design also prevents confounds with another motivation (a desire to act as others expect us to act) not frequently considered but consistent with much existing evidence. We also observe that subjects who tell the truth are more likely to believe that others will tell the truth as well.     

A real-world analysis of healthcare costs and relative risk of hyperprolactinemia associated with antipsychotic treatments in the United States

Abstract

Aims: Antipsychotic medications are associated with an increased risk of hyperprolactinemia, but differ in their propensity to cause this complication. This study aimed to assess the economic burden of hyperprolactinemia, and to compare its risk among adult patients using atypical antipsychotics (AAs) with a mechanism of action associated with no/low vs high/moderate prolactin elevation.

Methods: This retrospective cohort study was based on US Commercial and Medicaid claims databases. Healthcare costs were compared between matched hyperprolactinemia and hyperprolactinemia-free cohorts using a two-part model. Risk of hyperprolactinemia was compared between patients receiving AAs with a mechanism of action associated with no/low (no/low prolactin elevation cohort) vs high/moderate prolactin elevation (high/moderate prolactin cohort) using logistic regression.

Results: In the commercially insured sample, compared to the hyperprolactinemia-free cohort (n?=?499), the hyperprolactinemia cohort (n?=?499) was associated with incremental total healthcare costs of $5,732 ($20,081 vs $14,349; p?=?.004), and incremental medical costs of $3,861 ($13,218 vs $9,357; p?=?.040), mainly driven by hyperprolactinemia-related costs. In the Medicaid-insured sample, compared to the hyperprolactinemia-free cohort, the hyperprolactinemia cohort was associated with incremental total healthcare costs of $10,773 ($30,763 vs $19,990; p?=?.004), and incremental medical costs of $9,246 ($20,859 vs $11,613; p?=?.004), mainly driven by hyperprolactinemia-related and mental health-related costs. The odds of hyperprolactinemia in the no/low prolactin elevation cohort were 4–5-times lower than that in the high/moderate prolactin elevation cohort (odds ratio =0.21; p?<?.001).

Limitations: Hyperprolactinemia may be under-reported in claims data.

Conclusions: Hyperprolactinemia is associated with substantial healthcare costs. AAs associated with no/low prolactin elevation reduce the risk of hyperprolactinemia by 4–5-times compared to AAs associated with moderate/high prolactin elevation. Treatment options with minimal impact on prolactin levels may contribute to reducing hyperprolactinemia burden in AA-treated patients.     

Risk and performance estimation in hedge funds revisited: Evidence from errors in variables

This paper revisits the performance of hedge funds in the presence of errors in variables. To reduce the bias induced by measurement error, we introduce an estimator based on cross sample moments of orders three and four. This Higher Moment Estimation (HME) technique has significant consequences on the measure of factor loadings and the estimation of abnormal performance. Large changes in alphas can be attributed to measurement errors at the level of explanatory variables, while we emphasize some shifts in the economic contents of the equity risk premiums by switching from OLS to HME.     

Voluntary Environmental Agreements: Taking Up Positions And Meeting Pressure

This paper portrays voluntary agreements as a Nash-bargaining game between the authorities and the polluting industry. Before bargaining starts, the authorities threaten to introduce emission licences if the negotiations come to nothing, while industry, by the use of lobbying campaigns, can make it politically costly to regulate by law. The most likely game of the ones considered is characterized by the authorities first announcing a level of licensing, whereupon industry will adjust its lobbying activity. This game results in a relatively defensive industry and authorities than other games under consideration.     

Restructuring the State-Owned Banking Sector: A Comparative Assessment of Approaches in Central Europe

MOCT-MOST: Economic Policy in Transitional Economies -